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PROGRESS AS A SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPT

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I. THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT STUDY

The idea of progress is one of the most elusive notions which the student of society is called upon to examine. This is painfully evident in the indiscriminating and chaotic use to which the term has been put. What scheme of social rearrangement, however fantastic, impossible, or vicious, has not been hailed as the very embodiment of progress? Like the much abused liberty of Madame Roland's pathetic lament, progress has served as the excuse for reckless iconoclasm of every sort.

Yet, in spite of despair on the part of some sociologists of so defining the idea of progress that it may win a generally recognized meaning, there seems to be no prospect that the word will die out of the language.¹ If it is likely to continue in constant use, it is possible that some merit may attach to an effort to assort and criticize, in the light of present sociological theory, a few of the various significations which it has acquired, to analyze out of the mass of meanings a few definite characteristics, and to formulate them into a criterion which may serve as a measure of social progress.

Some of the pitfalls into which users of the term have fallen are suggested by the word itself. Its most obvious implication is movement, change (*progreior*, "to walk forth, to advance"). Hence there have been those who have felt that the essence of progress is a break with the past, and that whatever is new and different must also be higher and better. This idea has often been associated with some phase of the age-long notion of evolution, which, dressed in one philosophic garment or another, has appeared in almost every century since speculative thought commenced. Whatever the evolutionary process has brought

¹ Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 185-89.

has been accepted somewhat in the spirit of the stoic emperor: "Nothing is for me too early or too late which thy seasons bring, O Nature." It is perhaps enough to insist at this point that "evolution" and "progress," although closely related in meaning, are far from being synonymous terms which may be used interchangeably.

Another notion, implicit in the term, should have gone a long way toward preventing the undiscerning glorification of change *per se*. The most literal kind of progress—e. g., that of an army up a hill—is clearly not fixed in the nature of things, but is relative to the purpose of the general in command, or to the larger purposes back of the military movement. If the enemy be found to have a vastly superior force, skilfully concealed behind impregnable fortifications, it may turn out that the attacking general finds progress to lie in the direction of his own camp. Again, a certain social or religious club has been organized. A civic crisis has resulted in its taking an active part in municipal politics. Let us inquire whether the club is progressing. Clearly the answer depends upon the purpose which is held to be embodied in it. A, who is enthusiastic over the municipal programme which the club has espoused, will think that the club is progressing admirably, while B, who regards politics as no proper concern of the organization, regrets its evident decline. In national groups the dependence of judgments regarding progress upon the national types venerated by the judges is a matter of common knowledge. To the thorough-going individualist the amplification of the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission is held to be a national calamity, while to a believer in the efficacy of state intervention it may seem the only hopeful solution of a threatening national problem.

If, then, men are found to differ in their practical judgments as to what constitutes progress in the case of the various kinds of enterprises which make up the business of human association, it is not to be wondered at that the sociologists have been of many minds in regard to a proper standard of human progress in general.

The aim of the present paper will be to examine some of the

most noteworthy formulations of progress, and with their aid to attempt to frame a definition of a rational purpose suitable to serve as the standard of judgment of social change.

A word of caution may perhaps be needed at this point. Much valuable work has been done in the direction of defining the causes of social evolution, both progressive and regressive.² It is no part of the plan of the present study to enter into any discussion of the "factors of social change." The idea of progress, not its methods or means of accomplishment, is the subject to which attention will be confined. It is true, however, that in one or two instances the standards or definitions of progress which will be examined confuse the mechanism of social change with the essence of progress. This will be pointed out in the proper place somewhat at length.

It would doubtless be unwise to attempt any demonstration of the fact of progress before entering upon a criticism of the meaning of the term. Let it suffice to say that the progress which the present study seeks to define does not imply continuous, uninterrupted advance along a smooth path, but rather the halting, infrequent lunges forward which the actual page of history discloses. It is possible to assume a consistently agnostic attitude upon the subject of human evolution and to deny all significance to judgments of better or worse, passed upon human life-conditions in different ages, on the ground that the standards for such judgments are a set of mere unanchored relativities. No writer has, however, been met with who is ready to deny all relations of forward or backward or of higher or lower in the different stages of human advancement. Such denial could proceed only from one to whom life is a moral and intellectual jungle, chaotic and meaningless.

If, then, social valuations are universal, and, indeed inevitable, it is decidedly worth while that they should be founded, not on narrow interests or artificial conceptions of life, but upon a survey of the largest horizon of truth about humanity which it is possible for the eye to sweep.³

² Cf., e. g., Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*; Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, chap. viii; and Carver's compilation entitled *Sociology and Social Progress*.

³ Cf. Small, *General Sociology*, Part VIII.

The human race must have passed through a considerable portion of its history before any very definite notions of the succession of generations and of areas could have been formed. When the tribal past first rises to the rank of a clearly grasped idea, it is associated with the very natural view that the present times are distinctly inferior to the days of old, that the golden age lies in the far-distant past.⁴ This notion is closely analogous to the common experience of individuals who, as the poet tells us, feel that as youth vanishes there passes away a glory from the earth.

Only with the development of a technique of tradition more perfect than that of primitive peoples can a sufficient sweep of history be brought into view to lead to the conclusion that the past was crude and imperfect, while the present shows increasing measures of advance. Such a view, although rarely if ever formed in the Orient, was reached by many of the classical philosophers.⁵ The oriental idea of cycles of change, rather than of gradual and continuous progress, was, however, usually woven into the fabric of ancient views of human history. This was suggested no doubt by the regular succession of changes seen in the movements of the heavenly bodies, the return of the seasons, the course of growth and decay in the animal and vegetable world, as well as by periods of degeneration and decline visible in the history of nations.⁶

Through the early Christian centuries the doctrine of progress in human affairs was held in many forms, which were characteristic of the theological views of their advocates. Thus Tertullian, Augustine, Vincent of Lerins stood forth as champions of a progressive advance in history.⁷ During the Middle Ages, as indeed in most other periods, the history of the idea of progress is hardly more than the record of partial perceptions of an advance movement in human affairs. These partial con-

⁴ Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France*, pp. 90 ff.; De Greef, *Le transformisme social*, pp. 21, 31 ff.

⁵ Flint, *op. cit.*, pp. 90 ff.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 90 ff.; De Greef, *loc. cit.*

⁷ Flint, *op. cit.*, pp. 98, 100, 101, 152 ff.

ceptions related themselves to different aspects of human life. They ranged from the extremely theological idea of a progress in revelation to the doctrine of the progress of knowledge. Partial views of human progress, however, such as a recognition of improvements in the arts or of the increase of knowledge, are to be sharply distinguished from a belief in progress as a universal law of history. And this latter, moreover, is quite different from a belief in human perfectibility or in the constant improvement of "human nature" or of the individual human organism. A detailed account of the growth of the idea of progress will be found in the works of Flint and De Greef to which reference has already been made in the footnotes.

It is not possible to discuss here at greater length the extent to which belief in progress has prevailed in different ages, nor would an extended discussion of the mere existence of such belief possess any intimate relationship to the purpose of this paper, namely, to formulate a standard of social progress. With these few words upon the general course of the history of the idea of progress, let us turn to an examination of some of the principal views which have been entertained with regard to the nature of progress.

II. EARLY FORMULATIONS OF A STANDARD OF PROGRESS

Assuming a view of human society which recognizes a gradual improvement visible in history, let us examine briefly some of the conceptions which have been held of the nature of this progress. Throughout this section the writer desires to acknowledge a special obligation to the summaries and criticisms contained in Flint's work on the *Philosophy of History*.

One of the most common forms in which the doctrine of progress has been cast is that which regards it as the working-out of a divine plan or purpose whose details have in some manner been arrived at by the one who holds the view in question.⁸ It often regards revelation or deduction from revelation as the ultimate source of knowledge about the development and destiny

⁸ Ward's term for this view is "theo-teleology," which he distinguishes from "anthropo-teleology."

of human society. Progress in such a view is approximation to an ideal which is attributed to the Divine Will.

The *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* of Bishop Bossuet affords an excellent example of the use of this method.⁹ From first to last this work is an interpretation of human history in terms of the purposes of the Creator, who is represented as making "use of the Assyrians and Babylonians to chastise his people; of the Persians to restore it; of Alexander and his immediate successors to protect it,"¹⁰ and of many other agencies; all to the intent that in the end, after centuries of this sort of intervening care, the Christian faith might spread and triumph in the world. Hegel also regarded the process of human history as the working-out of the Divine Will, which he identified with the "Idea of Freedom," thus "translating the language of Religion into that of Thought."¹¹ Baron Bunsen likewise found that "the principle of the progress of humanity necessarily has its root in the law of divine self-manifestation."¹² This law he regarded as the increasing consciousness of God which is the motive force in the development of the race and the inspiration of all progress in language, politics, and culture.¹³

The criticism which is suggested by this view of progress is not directed against the belief that "through the ages one increasing purpose runs," but against the doctrine that the nature of progress can be given a final statement in terms of the Divine Will. As Flint points out in this connection, "religious truths are inferences from scientific laws, not these laws themselves nor the rationale of them."¹⁴ Thus, to take any given formulation of the Divine Will and, losing sight of the inference from which it arose, to turn it backward upon the facts of social phenomena as the standard of progress, is a false and fruitless method of procedure. Of course, such a concept as the Divine Plan is

⁹ Flint, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-34.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

¹¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, Sibree's translation, p. 21.

¹² Quoted by Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France and Germany*, p. 558.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 559.

¹⁴ Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France*, p. 226.

merely formal, and hence entirely lacking in significance and applicability, except in so far as it has been given a content from the observation and experience of human life.¹⁵

The value, therefore, of such a measure of progress, like that of all other terms out of which can be drawn only the meaning that is first put into them, will vary greatly from one user to another, according to the breadth and loftiness of the conceptions for which the term stands in their minds.¹⁶

Another somewhat naïve formulation of social progress is that implicit in the venerable idea of natural law. Like the view already discussed, it treats of progress in a more or less a priori fashion from the standpoint of some objective reality or criterion external to the social process itself. It may perhaps be objected that those who have made the greatest use of this conception can scarcely be classified as holding a genuine theory of progress at all, for, as in the case of the eighteenth-century adherents of natural rights, the doctrine was generally associated with a profound conviction of the retrograde movement of the history of civilization. Progress with them did not mean belief in a law of advance in human society, operative from the first, but rather in the possibility of winning back by an appeal to reason the primitive state of man lost since the days when he was unshackled by artificial restraints and oppression. There are, however, two reasons for some consideration of natural law in this connection. The first is the anticipations which the idea contains of a later and more adequate view of human progress, and the second is the fact that the notion, freed from the doctrine of retrogression, still persists in the minds of some recent writers as a sort of hazy expression for the anticipated moral achievement of the race.

Professor Ritchie has pointed out the important service which was rendered by the Roman idea of the law of nature:

When the codification of Roman law by Justinian . . . had given it a character of finality, the conception of the law of nature was received by the mediaeval world as the conception of something not merely more perfect than

¹⁵ Small, *op. cit.*, p. 669; cf. Flint, *loc. cit.*

¹⁶ Small, *op. cit.*, pp. 669, 670.

any positive human laws, but as something distinct from them. It came to be thought of as an ideal code, not merely as the common or universal element amid the varieties of human usage, but distinct from positive human laws, which might very often conflict with this code. This reverence for the law of nature did good service in helping to bring some degree of order and system into the chaos of French law.¹⁷

In modern times we find the idea given clear expression at least as early as the Puritan Revolution. Its appearance at this time seems to have been inspired by the influence of the Reformation, which tended to substitute for the authority of the church the appeal to the individual reason and conscience. A larger measure of political privilege likewise was demanded on the ground of "natural rights derived from Adam and right reason."¹⁸

Striking examples of adherence to this theory of natural law are found in the writings of the Physiocrats and in the philosophy of Adam Smith. Says Dugald Stewart:

The great and leading object of his speculations . . . is to illustrate the provisions made by Nature in the principles of the human mind, and in the circumstances of man's external situation, for a gradual and progressive augmentation in the means of national wealth, and to demonstrate that the most effectual means of advancing a people to greatness is to maintain that order of things which Nature has pointed out.¹⁹

In criticism of this purely formal conception of natural law as the criterion of individual and social progress, no extended discussion is necessary. It must be evident that neither nature nor natural law can suffice to point out human destiny. The only sense in which the terms can be significant is that which makes them synonymous with the *ideal*. And to say that the moral progress of the individual or the goal of social progress lies in the direction of the ideal is mere tautology.

The attempt has been made, however, to free the notion from all objectionable features and to render it consistent with the results of the history of moral standards, while maintaining the formula of Wolff that "natural law is that for which there is sufficient reason in the very nature of men and things."²⁰

¹⁷ *Natural Rights*, p. 41.

¹⁸ Ritchie, *op. cit.*, pp. 6 ff.

¹⁹ T. E. Cliffe Leslie, *Essays in Political and Moral Philosophy*, p. 152.

²⁰ Fred M. Taylor, "The Law of Nature," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. I, p. 564.

When all proper concessions and limitations have been imposed upon this formulation, it turns out to mean simply the "law which is determined by the nature of men and circumstances."²¹ The course of action prescribed by this law is declared to be one, eternal, immutable, because it is determined by the unchangeable nature of things. Yet it is admitted that human nature and circumstances undergo change, and that the "conditions under which the applicability of a law of nature is determined must be empirical, and so subject to the limitations of time, etc."²² In other words, when we have examined a given situation in the light of all that we know of human experience and of human nature, and have given due weight to all the special circumstances of the case, and have at length arrived conscientiously and soberly at a judgment regarding what is right and proper to do—then, if our judgment turns out to be a true one, we may have the satisfaction (if we could only be sure it were a true judgment) of knowing that we are acting in accordance with an immutable, eternal law of nature; but if, alas, our judgment is not true, we may yet have the satisfaction of knowing that somewhere in the heavens above, or wherever the immutable laws of nature may choose to dwell, there is a conceivable course of action exactly and eternally fitted to this particular situation.

The alternatives which this illustration offers are sufficiently clear; either natural law is simply a somewhat more glorious appellation bestowed upon a judgment of human values arrived at in the usual painful human way, or it is a term absolutely empty of content, and hence without significance for the student in search of a valid criterion of human progress.

While the doctrine of a law of nature has, then, little to offer in the way of positive results, nevertheless, in its classical form it contained foreshadowings of a great truth, viz: that the chief worth and value of life, and at the same time the measure of progress of the race, is not to be found in the degree of *complexity* and *artificiality* which life assumes, but rather in the presence and diffusion of those essentials of human well-being which a rational study of the nature and history of man may reasonably be expected to yield.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 578.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 579.

The last of the purely formal notions of progress which will be included in this brief sketch of earlier views on this subject is that exemplified in Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*. It involves a belief that there is something inevitable in human progress; that deep down in the nature of things there is some hidden spring which is infallibly urging forward the movement of history. This extremely comfortable conviction need not necessarily rest upon the metaphysical foundation which Hegel provided for it; it may be traceable to a strong reliance upon the spread of enlightenment such as prevailed during the later years of the eighteenth century,²³ and which led to extreme optimism such as that of the doctrine of human perfectibility held by Condorcet.

On the other hand, it may be induced by intoxication with the notion of biological evolution,²⁴ which produces upon some writers an exhilarating sense of swing and sweep in human affairs, leading them to disdain sober, analytical methods and to devote themselves to accounting for human progress by easy references to the biological laws of struggle and survival, or even of constructing by the aid of mental imagery a more or less spectacular notion of ascending series of phenomena, each of which is felt to be intrinsically "higher" than those which preceded it. It is very easy to describe the course of natural and social evolution in terms of pageantry and spectacle—to see the succession of types and species, and in the contemplation of the splendidly ascending series to lose all thought of the more fundamental questions of *how* and *why*. This notion of a so-called ascending series, once imported from biology into the account of human history, loses its primarily anatomical character and takes on in the social series a moral character, by virtue of which it figures as an "ameliorative trend." This ameliorative trend may even arise in the biological series itself; but, wherever its origin, it is apt sooner or later to attach itself to the whole evolutionary process, not in the legitimate character of a reasoned induction, nor yet as a frankly avowed article of a cosmic faith, but rather

²³ Balfour, *Essays and Addresses*, 2d ed., pp. 244 ff.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 244 ff.

as a pseudo-scientific world-view which obscures and misinterprets the actual evolutionary processes which it seeks to explain. Hence arises the popular use of evolution as synonymous with advancement and progress. Thus an optimistic conclusion with regard to the trend of movement of the evolutionary processes is allowed to elbow exact conceptions of these processes out of the circle of attention, and, instead of the pursuit of the painfully slow methods of scientific investigation, we have results which break full-fledged from the shell of an a priori moral assumption. But a full discussion of the place of biological conceptions in the doctrine of progress must be reserved for a later section.

The most frequent occasion of the view which sees in human progress the outworking of an inner necessity is a fondness for metaphysical speculation which leads to the development of all human history out of some fundamental conception, such as Hegel's self-realization of the infinite Spirit.

Starting from Spirit or "self-contained existence," Hegel traces human history to a single principle, namely, the unfolding or actualization of the potential nature of Spirit, whose essential attribute is freedom, which, in "coming to a consciousness of itself," thereby realizes its existence. Thus:

The history of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom; a progress whose development, according to the necessity of its nature, it is our business to investigate.²⁵

This passage, brief as it is, suggests two very pertinent criticisms which have been passed upon the view of history which it contains. As Flint has pointed out in connection with a similar conception held by the historian Michelet:

Growth in freedom is only one of several facts all equally essential to humanity and its development. Truth, beauty, and morality can no more be resolved into freedom than freedom into any of them.²⁶

A still more fundamental error lies in the inevitable character with which the great philosopher invests this age-long achievement of freedom. What we are led to seek in history is a growth in the consciousness of freedom which is itself not

²⁵ Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, pp. 18-20.

²⁶ Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France*, p. 542.

free, but strictly conditioned by the "necessity of the nature" of this progress.²⁷ The Hegelian conception of progress turns out to be only an aprioristic deduction as empty of positive content as the purely formal ideas of a Divine Purpose and of a Law of Nature.

III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THEORIES OF EVOLUTION TO THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS

In Parts I and II we have followed in outline the origin and development of the notion of progress through some of its earlier forms. The next step will be to trace the characteristic forms which the idea has assumed during the latter half of the nineteenth century under the influence of modern evolutionary conceptions. Given a belief in human progress defined, for example, in terms of the Hegelian metaphysics without a belief in an advancing order in the organic world (Hegel regarded nature as stationary, while society was marked by the peculiar characteristic of progress), what will be the effect produced upon the idea of human progress by the appearance of a theory of universal evolution such as that contained in Spencer's system, or by the appearance of an authoritative doctrine of the gradual modification of species through the selective agency of environment?

This is our problem from the historical point of view. A further question relates to the value for the concept of progress of the contribution made by these readings of the law of evolution.

As early as 1857, or more than a year before the publication of the *Origin of Species*, Spencer's essay on "Progress—Its Law and Cause" appeared in the *Westminster Review*. This essay, as Spencer went to some pains to point out in a later work,²⁸ contains in outline the scheme of evolutionary philosophy which is

²⁷ Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France and Germany*, p. 528; cf. Carrau, "La philosophie de l'histoire et la loi du progrès," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, September-October, 1875, pp. 584-86.

²⁸ Preface to fourth edition of *First Principles*, pp. vii, viii; and note printed above the essay in the collection of *Essays*, Vol. I, p. 8.

associated with his name. The purpose of the argument may be indicated in a few words. Discarding current teleological conceptions of progress, which focus attention upon human happiness, Spencer proposes to leave out of sight "concomitants and beneficial consequences, and to ask what Progress is in itself."²⁹ He holds that

It is settled beyond dispute that organic progress consists in a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous [cites Wolff, Goethe, and Von Baer].

Now, we propose in the first place to show that this law of organic progress is the law of all progress. Whether it be in the development of the Earth, in the development of Life upon its surface, in the development of Society, of Government, of Manufactures, of Commerce, of Language, Literature, Science, Art, this same evolution of the simple into the complex, through a process of continuous differentiation, holds throughout. From the earliest traceable cosmical changes down to the latest results of civilization, we shall find that the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous is that in which Progress essentially consists.³⁰

It will be seen that as in each phenomenon of today, so from the beginning, the decomposition of every expended force into several forces has been perpetually producing a higher complication; that the increase of heterogeneity so brought about is still going on, and must continue to go on; and that thus Progress is not an accident, not a thing within human control, but a beneficent necessity.³¹

With this idea of increasing heterogeneity there were later incorporated the other elements of increasing definiteness and increasing integration, which indeed Spencer had already recognized in essays written previous to 1857.³²

In subsequent statements of this law the title was changed from the "law of progress" to the "law of evolution." Referring to this essay in his *Autobiography*, Spencer writes:

Though it began by pointing out that the word progress is commonly used in too narrow a sense; yet the fact that I continued to use the word shows that I had not then recognized the need for a word which has no teleological implications.³³

Whatever the wording used, it is clear that Spencer saw in

²⁹ *Westminster Review*, April, 1857, p. 446.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 446, 447.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 484.

³² Spencer, *Autobiography*, Vol. I, p. 586.

³³ *Ibid.*; cf. Saleeby, *Evolution, The Master Key*, p. 281.

human affairs the operation of the same universal cosmic law of change that is working out its "beneficent" results in every other class of phenomena.

Now, the crucial point concerns the significance to be attached to the term "beneficent" as applied to the cosmic process. Two alternatives present themselves. It is possible, consistently with a belief in a law of universal evolution, either to regard the evolutionary process as removed entirely from the realm of evaluative judgments—that is to say, to make of it purely a sequence category; or, on the other hand, to attribute to the process of evolution thus defined the character of "goodness," "beneficence," upon the ground of its own contained elements—or, in other words, to constitute its leading characteristics a standard of values and the criterion of human progress. The first of these alternatives is expressed in the words of a recent writer: "Science knows no law of progress, but a law of change. Progress is obviously an anthropic term, denoting merely an ideal of ours."³⁴ And it is this view of the matter which Spencer, as a matter of fact, seems to have adhered to, at least in his later writings.

We see from the significant statement in the *Autobiography* that Spencer regarded himself as having described, not, as he had supposed, a beneficent ascending series or process, but rather simply the mode of procedure visible in the universe, viewed under the aspect merely of a category of change. This view of the matter is confirmed by reference to other works in which Spencer gives us clearer statements of his social ideals. For example, in the following passage, after showing that, while in a primitive stage of social development the militant type of organization is highest, during a later stage, industrial rather than military competition underlies the success of nations, he makes the following formulation:

Social organization is to be considered high in proportion as it subserves individual welfare, because in a society the units are sentient and the aggregate insentient; and the industrial type is higher because, *in that state of permanent peace to which civilization is tending*, it subserves individual welfare better than the militant type.³⁵

³⁴ Saleeby, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

³⁵ *Principles of Sociology*, 3d ed., Vol. I, postscript of Part II, pp. 587, 588.

Professor Sorley has phrased this rather vague moral ideal of Spencer as follows:

The moral criterion may be derived from a problematic future state of the human race on this earth when the need for struggle has disappeared and all things go smoothly.³⁶

Again, in *Social Statics, Abridged and Revised*, Spencer writes:

There is another form under which civilization can be generalized. We may consider it as a progress towards that constitution of man and society required for the complete manifestation of every one's individuality. To be that which he naturally is—to do just what he would spontaneously do—is essential to the full happiness of each, and therefore to the greatest happiness of all. Hence, in virtue of the law of adaptation, our advance must be towards a state in which this entire satisfaction of every desire, or perfect fulfilment of individual life, becomes possible.³⁷

Thus we may conclude that, in spite of early tendencies toward the identification of human progress with a cosmical process, Spencer has laid the greater emphasis upon the realization of individual happiness through an age-long process of adaptation.

It has remained for De Greef to push through to logical consistency and to enunciate in the clearest terms the biological view of progress which is always lurking, albeit a little unsteadily, in the background of Spencer's writing. While the Darwinians who have made excursions into sociology, as we shall see, have generally mistaken the principal mechanism of biological evolution—that is, the process of natural selection—for progress, De Greef, on the other hand, is careful not to overemphasize the significance of this factor for the theory of social progress; but he has nevertheless fallen into a similar error in confusing one of the chief incidents of biological and social evolution—namely, increasing organization—with social progress.

In common with other writers already cited, he distinguishes progress from the simple filiation of past with present and of present with future, which constitutes merely successive development; for example, successive adaptations to a changing environ-

³⁶ W. R. Sorley, *Recent Tendencies in Ethics*, p. 44.

³⁷ P. 253.

ment form an evolutionary series, but they may or may not constitute progress.³⁸ Progress

implies a perfecting of the social organization, a perfecting such that the new society represents a variety superior to the mother society. This superiority should appear in a greater structure, and one, moreover, that is more differentiated and better co-ordinated, and in a corresponding vital functioning.³⁹

This general conception is later made the basis for the formulation of a semi-mathematical law: "Social progress is directly proportional to the mass, to the differentiation, and to the co-ordination of the social elements and organs."⁴⁰

This criterion of social progress is, indeed, nothing less than the criterion of progress for all living things.

We understand . . . that the growth or the degeneration of life in general, including that of the social life, always and necessarily corresponds with the growth or the degeneration of the organization, including the social organization.⁴¹

From this point of view progress is seen to involve better and better co-ordination in higher centers.⁴² A final quotation will illustrate the relation in De Greef's mind between organization and social achievement:

Neither the development nor the amount of wealth, of population, of art of knowledge, constitutes in itself progress, but only the conditions which may favor it; organization and progress are synonymous; they are substitutes the one for the other, as money is for merchandise.⁴³

De Greef's idea of social progress is a purely biological one. The perfecting of social organization by constantly greater specialization and co-ordination of parts is less crude, it is true, than the view which sees in the process of natural selection itself a sufficient definition of social progress, but it nevertheless significantly fails to furnish a definite content to the term "welfare" which is fundamental to any definition of progress. To suppose that degree of organization is the only measure of social progress, or even that it is a valid criterion at all, is to mistake one of the most conspicuous incidents in the general evolutionary process for the chief element of value from the human point of view.

³⁸ *Le transformisme social*, pp. 416, 417, 422, 423.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 337.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 353.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 353.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 355.

As a matter of fact, advanced societies do pass, as Spencer pointed out, from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, which is accompanied by a more and more complete integration of the whole and by increased interdependence of the parts. But such an evolution in itself offers no ground for evaluation of any sort. In the case of the organism it is only when we recognize the connection between complexity of structure and the range of sensibility and of consciousness which this makes possible, that the use of the term "progress" is justifiable.⁴⁴ So in human societies the degree of organization is unimportant, except in so far as it is accompanied by a larger human welfare measured by the type of consciousness diffused through the society, or, in other words, by the degree to which the distinctly human aspects of welfare are realized. We may, therefore, conclude that social evolution is marked by increasing social integration and specialization, and by continuous adjustment to environment, but that these things do not constitute nor define progress.

We pass now from the first evolutionary definition of progress, that of the degree of organization theory, to a second, the Darwinian, or, more exactly, the Darwinistic, for Darwin himself made no attempt to derive from biological processes the sole criterion of moral or even physical well-being. Although the Spencerian version of evolution was universal in its scope, while that of Darwin concerned a single phase of organic life, nevertheless it has been the latter which during the past half-century has revolutionized the natural sciences and profoundly modified methods and tendencies in the social sciences. Here too we find materials which seem adaptable to use in framing a definition of social progress. Here are special processes of undeniable importance in explaining social evolution, which may easily be mistaken for categories of evaluation, instead of categories of simple sequence, which in reality they are.

Professor Sorley has pointed out three different positions which have been taken relative to the value of the evolutionary

⁴⁴ Cf. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. II, pp. 176 ff.

process for purposes of judging worth and goodness in human life.⁴⁵ The first is that of Darwin, who held "that natural selection is a criterion of moral fitness only up to a certain stage, and that the noblest part of man's morality is independent of this test."⁴⁶ The second position is that of Huxley, who set the cosmic and ethical processes over against one another as direct opposites. Neither of these views falls within the limits of the present criticism. But when we come to the third position, which goes to the opposite extreme from that of Huxley, we come upon a view having a very vital bearing upon the theory of progress. This third view varies from the belief that the process of organic evolution, commonly identified with natural selection (although in part mistakenly), is the only clue to judgments of worth in human life and society, to an adherence to a vague natural-process theory of moral values which stands in a certain relationship to the natural law conception of the Physiocrats.

For purposes of criticism it will be convenient to take up briefly three writers, working from widely different points of view, who nevertheless share this general tendency. They are Benjamin Kidd, Ludwig Gumplowicz, and Friedrich Nietzsche.

The theory of Benjamin Kidd presents an interesting case of the evolutionary, or more specifically of the natural-selection, theory put to an extreme use in the explanation of human progress. It is the application, in a diluted and rather vague form, of a perfectly definite biological process to the problem of developmental phenomena in society. Mr. Kidd's point of departure from the side of biology seems to be the fact of the ultimate survival of certain species whose individual members at a given time are apparently outclassed by individual members of competing species; yet so effective is the subordination of the good of the individual to that of the species that the former species, even at the expense of its individual members, achieves ultimate victory over its less well-regulated competitors. From the point of view of human society, Mr. Kidd seizes upon that rather large class of attainments, such as mathematical, artistic, metaphysical, and

⁴⁵ W. R. Sorley, *Recent Tendencies in Ethics*, p. 51.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

particularly religious qualities, which apparently are without significance in the struggle for existence in the immediate present. All that seems to be necessary in view of this situation, according to Mr. Kidd, is "a considerable extension of the conception of the method in which the principle of natural selection operates in life."⁴⁷ This extension is found in the principle of *projected efficiency*.

It was evident that when we conceived the law of Natural Selection operating through unlimited periods of time, and concerned with the indefinitely larger interests of numbers always infinite and always in the future, that we had in view a principle of which there had been no clear conception at first, namely, a principle of inherent necessity in the evolutionary process compelling ever towards the sacrifice on a vast scale of the present and the individual in the interests of the future and the universal.⁴⁸

In this somewhat remarkable passage we have an excellent example of an indiscriminating use of the results of natural science. From the law of natural selection, with its even-handed preservation of the "fit," which may mean the short-lived, or the rudimentary, or the inferior, rather than the long-lived, or the individually perfect, Kidd deduces a semi-mystical law of future efficiency, in accordance with which he declares the age-long process of evolution works.

Now, quite apart from the question as to exactly how large a figure the process of natural selection makes in social evolution—a question entirely removed from the present discussion—it is pertinent to point out the obvious implications for the theory of progress of such a view as this, which seeks so assiduously to demonstrate evolutionary—that is, survival—value, in the case of the whole range of human characteristics and qualities. Human progress is thus regarded as the necessary outcome of a universal biological process conceived, if only grasped with sufficient comprehensiveness, as working out the noblest results in every branch of human activity.

⁴⁷ "The Application of the Doctrine of Evolution to Sociological Theory and Problems," Prefatory Essay, *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (10th ed.), Vol. XXIX, p. 14.

⁴⁸ Benjamin Kidd, *Western Civilization*, p. 57.

Gumplowicz divides all attempts to understand human life and society into three classes, according as theistic, rationalistic, and naturalistic explanations are resorted to.⁴⁹ The first two classes belong to the past and the present; the third only, the naturalistic, will suffice for the future. But in seeking a naturalistic interpretation of history, it is not individuals but groups which must be made the basal elements in sociological theory; for it is group reactions which, conformably to law, make up the content of history.⁵⁰ In Gumplowicz we find the union of a purely naturalistic account of history, which he regards as the necessary development through group-struggle of purely natural tendencies, and an unusual degree of skepticism with regard to the fact of human progress.⁵¹ Although he avoids identifying the social organism with other organisms purely biological in character, nevertheless, as Barth points out, he contents himself with "the very well-worn opinions of the less historical than natural-historical Darwinistic habit of thought."⁵² This natural-history view of society, indeed, is the reason for the mention of his system of thought in the present section, although it would not have been far out of place in a previous chapter on progress as increasing conformity to a law of nature. Thus in the *Outlines of Sociology* he writes:

There can be but one principle of human rationality and of human morals and ethics: to be governed by the import and tendency of nature's sway. . . .

As man himself is subject to nature, . . . he can scarcely conceive another mode of existence; and this one seems right and just, reasonable and moral (sittlich). He has no other standard for the events of life than the assumed will, i. e., the visible tendency, of nature.⁵³

But the central idea, and the one which furnishes the title to Gumplowicz' earlier work, is the evolutionary incident of struggle. It is by virtue of this struggle among themselves that "the heterogeneous ethical and even social groups and communities carry forward the movement of history."⁵⁴

⁴⁹ *Der Rassenkampf*, p. 5.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁵¹ *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 207 ff.

⁵² *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, p. 246.

⁵³ P. 176.

⁵⁴ *Der Rassenkampf*, p. 193, et *passim*.

In this respect Gumpłowicz relates himself to a certain extent to the German philosopher Nietzsche, who has also made such heroic use of the primarily biological concept of struggle. To Nietzsche the essentially noble and admirable end and goal of life is the "will to power"—the triumphant self-expression of human nature after the fashion of the primitive Teuton. "At the ground of all these noble races," he says, "the beast of prey, the splendid, *blond beast*, lustfully roving in search of spoils and victory, cannot be mistaken."⁵⁵ Again: ". . . all noble morality takes its rise from a triumphant Yea-saying to one's self,"⁵⁶ and once more he writes of "the positive fundamental conception of the noble valuation which is thoroughly saturated with life and passion and says: 'We, the noble, we, the good. we, the fair, we, the happy!'"⁵⁷ Thus, by restoring to honor the fullest expression of life-impulses, by denying all value to self-repression and weak-kneed altruism, "we restore to men," according to this philosophy,

their cheerful courage for such actions as are reputed selfish, and re-establish their value—we relieve them of their evil consciences. And as up to our time these have been by far the most frequent, and will be so in all future, we deprive the whole conception of actions and life of its evil appearance. This is a very important result. If man would no longer think himself wicked, he would cease to be so.⁵⁸

Here once again we see an incident of the evolutionary process exalted into a measure of worth. As an expounder of Nietzsche has well said, his system was "a transference to the sphere of human action of the unceasing warfare of the organic world with which Darwin had made men familiar."⁵⁹

Similar lines of inquiry might be pursued through other portions of our sociological literature, with the result of showing that in a large number of instances the attempt to explain society, and particularly social advance, has led far afield from the significant and essential characteristic of human beings, the striving

⁵⁵ *Genealogy of Morals*, p. 41.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 36.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁵⁸ *The Dawn of Day*, pp. 150, 151.

⁵⁹ Grace Neal Dolson, "The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche," *Cornell Studies in Philosophy*, No. 3, p. 100.

after the accomplishment of certain life-purposes, and has substituted for this characteristic all manner of interpretations of and variations upon particular processes and incidents, borrowed in large measure from the sciences of external nature. Such terms as "struggle," "conflict," "survival," and "adaptation" stand for legitimate and highly important concepts in social theory, but concepts nevertheless which can give us no clue to the true nature of human progress.

Progress is essentially a teleological idea, an idea of *value*. It cannot, therefore, be reduced to a formulation in terms of mechanism. And the theory of natural selection is essentially a theory of the mechanics of a process. Evolution in general is either the name for a process judged to be good, and connoting not only the process, but the judgment also; or else it is the name universally applicable to change, to becoming, wherever observable in the world. In the present paper the term is used in the latter and colorless sense.

Now, in separating the sequence category from the value category, the chief danger lies in the direction of supposing that the value category itself is in some way independent of the sequence category. This is manifestly an error. The problem then lies in reconciling a standard of human values, which is valid not because it corresponds to a social actuality, but to a social desideratum—that is, to a social need—with that other dominant conception, that whatever exists in the world is the surviving term of an age-long series, the final member, up to the present, of a vast company of which every particular is linked to those which go before and after by genetic ties.

It is one thing to trace the evolutionary history of standards of value—to show that the progress of society depends upon successive readjustments passed upon its technique of living at every point in its life-history; that the standards of today are but the standards of yesterday rejudged and restated in the light of a new and different and presumably better-analyzed situation; but it is quite a different thing to insist that this dialectic of reaccommodation between social experience and social ideals considered as an actual process constitutes the standard of progress. It is

undoubtedly the evolutionary mechanism by which we win all of progress that is attained.⁶⁰ But there is as yet no ground for a judgment of values. The later stages of this process, simply because they are later, are no better, no higher, than the earlier, any more than what the geologists call an old mountain range is better than a young range which is just commencing the life-process through which mountain ranges pass. All stages of both processes are mile-stones in the universal becoming—all are good, we may believe; but why are any better?

It is more than likely that we shall be constrained to say in the end that what the social process has worked out is very good; but why should we be reduced to the necessity of adding that it is very good because the social process has worked it out? The idea of progress contains something more than the trend of the process by which progress has been reached. It involves a subjective evaluative element which might conceivably point in a direction quite opposed to the observable trend of the social process. This process, as a matter of fact, registers, like the needle tracing upon the cylinder, the movement of past social reaccommodations. Inasmuch as the changes in situation and environment form a series displaying a more or less continuous and cumulative character—e. g., continuous accumulation of wealth, increase of population, overcrowding, breaking-over of frontiers, etc.—it is not at all strange that the value series likewise displays a certain observable trend and not a series of mere oscillations. There are, moreover, certain fundamental human reactions which similar situations almost never fail to evoke—reactions some of which, indeed, are shared with the higher mammals; for example, love of offspring. In other words, successive generations have in many fundamental particulars reaffirmed the judgments of their predecessors, and in all probability will continue to do so until the end of time. But this reaffirmation of value elements in the life of society is only one side of reality; it must be supplemented by the process of reaccommodation mentioned above.

Now, at this point we might seem justified in concluding

⁶⁰ Cf. W. B. Pillsbury, "Trial and Error as a Factor in Evolution," *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. LXVIII, pp. 276-82 (March, 1906).

that whatever seems valuable to a given generation, whatever its own judgment affirms, constitutes a valid standard of progress for that generation. The act of social deliberation which precedes such a judgment embraces countless judgments of previous generations, and the resulting judgment doubtless possesses much in common with these past judgments, and in other respects continues certain tendencies which may be traced throughout the series due to the fundamental facts which have already been mentioned; but it is not inconceivable that a social valuation should make in many respects a well-marked break with the past. The continuity of social judgment, in other words, is not the test of its validity.

But it may be objected that the present argument leads to a sort of social subjectivism; whatever a tribe or a society affirms in its practice or its code is *ipso facto* worthful, and a valid criterion of social attainment. By no means. The largest social survey which the present generation is able to make is in no sense to be identified with the partial conceptions of life which may prevail in a given society at the present time. We may, therefore, maintain that that is valid for us, that that constitutes progress in our day, which, in the light of all human experience and all human striving and attaining, makes strongest appeal to the informed judgment of our generation. For the present it is enough to repeat that the criterion of progress, like everything else under the sun, is a product of evolution, but that it owes its validity, not to its evolutionary past, but to its efficiency in the present, in formulating the worthful elements which the whole process of human experience has disclosed.

The theory of evolution makes no contribution at all to these questions of worth or validity, or moral value. . . . All one can get out of it is certain canons for living, but none for good living. It may draw one's attention to this fact, if anybody's attention needs to be drawn to it, that existence is prior to well-being; but what the nature of well-being is—upon that it throws no light.⁶¹

IV. THE ECONOMIC VIEW OF PROGRESS

The economic interpretation of history is primarily a theory of social causation. In the place of anthropogeographic, or ethno-

⁶¹ W. R. Sorley, *Recent Tendencies in Ethics*, pp. 75, 76.

logical, or political, or ideological⁶² factors, the advocates of this theory insist upon the fundamental significance for historical development of the industrial and economic arrangements of an age or of a society. These economic facts alone, it is asserted, furnish the key to all the other phenomena of social life. Now, in so far as economic conditions have been held to be simply exceptionally important and decisive factors of social change, to that extent their present discussion is out of place, for the same reasons that discussion of many other factors of social development have been eliminated. But, as a matter of fact, have these interpreters of history been content to assign to the economic factor the rôle which this view of the matter presents? Let us turn to the theory itself and ascertain its bearings from the forms which it has assumed in the writings of its principal advocates.

Although anticipations of the so-called materialistic view of history are found in earlier writers, especially in Saint-Simon and Louis Blanc,⁶³ yet it is to Marx alone that the credit of being in a true sense the originator of the theory belongs. According to Barth,⁶⁴ we have nevertheless a considerable variety of conceptions of society from the economic point of view. For example, one writer, Durkheim, seizes upon division of labor—that is to say, upon the technique of human participation in the economic process—as the significant variant in the evolution of society. Another, Patten, sees in the augmentation of goods, which appears under the pleasure economy, the keynote to social development. While yet others must needs perceive in the technical aspects of the process of production—that is to say, in the series of stages which the history of industry exhibits—the true clue to the ongoing of the social process. Here, of course, belong Marx and the Marxians.

Inasmuch as what usually passes as the economic interpretation of history bears the undoubted impress of Marx's thought, it may be well to state in his own words, or in those of his col-

⁶² Cf. Barth's classification of the "einseitigen Geschichtsauffassungen" in his *Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*.

⁶³ Barth, *op. cit.*, pp. 304, 305; Seligman, *The Economic Interpretation of History*, Part I, chap. 4.

⁶⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 303.

league, Engels, the essential points which the theory was supposed by its authors to contain.

According to Engels, the fundamental proposition of the famous Manifesto of 1848 is very concisely stated to be in part:

That in every historical epoch the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch.⁶⁵

In his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* Marx made the following statement of the theory:

In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.⁶⁶

To quote from the manifesto:

When people speak of ideas that revolutionise society, they do but express the fact, that, within the old society, the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, authorized English translation of 1888, p. 5.

⁶⁶ English translation of N. I. Stone, author's preface, pp. 11, 12.

⁶⁷ P. 21.

Thus religious liberty and freedom of conscience in the eighteenth century are represented as the spiritual counterpart or expression of "the sway of free competition within the domain of knowledge."

It is not to be supposed, however, that Marx and Engels were blind to the presence of other factors than the economic nor to the constant interaction which goes on between them and the economic factor.⁶⁸ The latter, however, was held to be the most important and to "exert a preponderant influence in shaping the progress of society."⁶⁹

It is not that the economic situation is the cause in the sense of being the only active agent, and that everything else is only a passive result. It is, on the contrary, a case of mutual action on the basis of the economic necessity, which, in last instance, always works itself out.⁷⁰

That the socialistic turn given to the theory is not essential to it is made clear by the number of writers outside the ranks of the socialists who accept this view of history,⁷¹ as well as by the possibility of foreseeing an economic necessity of quite a different type from that which Marx regarded as about to usher in the socialistic régime. W. J. Ghent, for example, has given us a more or less fanciful sketch⁷² of the results of present social tendencies working out exactly the opposite result. There certainly is nothing inconsistent with a strictly economic interpretation of history in the belief, if anyone feels justified in entertaining it, that democracy is a transitory stage of development, and that, with the increasing centralization of production and the accumulation of wealth, a new form of aristocracy, suited to the new economic conditions, will gradually work itself out. That such a result seems far from probable is entirely apart from the point here emphasized.

⁶⁸ Th. G. Masaryk, in *Die philosophischen und sociologischen Grundlagen des Marxismus*, especially pp. 92-100 ff., makes a very penetrating analysis and criticism of this element of uncertainty as to the meaning and scope of the economic factor as used by Marx and his followers.

⁶⁹ Seligman, *op. cit.*, p. 67, in summing up the final statement given the theory by its founders.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 64; translated from Engels' letter of 1894, *Der sozialistische Akademiker*.

⁷¹ Seligman, *op. cit.*, Part II, chap. 2.

⁷² *Our Benevolent Feudalism*.

A closely related view is that held by Lassalle, who unites with the purely economic factors of social development the Hegelian concept of freedom and rationality, which, in ever greater measure, work themselves out in human history. Indeed, Lassalle carried with him through life so much of the Hegelian point of view that it is only within well-defined limits that he may even be mentioned in the same category with the economic interpreters of history. Bernstein specifically charges him not only with failure to trace mental concepts back to the circumstances from which they have developed and "to the economic conditions whose expression they are,"⁷³ but also with actually reversing the process and deriving the concrete materials themselves from the mental concepts which have grown out of them.⁷⁴ Thus in his *System der erworbenen Rechte* his treatment of the laws of inheritance among the Romans is ideological rather than historical, and involves constant use of the concept of the Roman *Volksgeist*, which is made to do duty in explaining the principles of the Roman legal system.⁷⁵

Yet, in spite of these facts, Lassalle's lucid analysis of the course of European history shows that he had grasped the significance of economic arrangements as few men have ever grasped it, even if he chose to disguise under the title of the laws of history what Marx would have pronounced economic necessity. For example, in the *Working Man's Programme* he said:

A revolution can never be *made*; all that can ever be done is to add external *moral recognition* to a revolution which has already entered into the actual relations of a community, and to *carry it out accordingly*.

To set about to *make* a revolution is the folly of immature minds which have no notion of the laws of history.

And it is for this reason equally foolish and childish to attempt to repress a revolution which has once developed itself in the womb of a community, and to oppose its moral recognition, or to utter against such a community, or the individuals who assist at its birth, the reproach that they are revolutionary. If the revolution has already found its way into the com-

⁷³ Edward Bernstein, *Ferdinand Lassalle as a Social Reformer*, p. 74; cf. Brandes, *Ferdinand Lassalle*, pp. 26, 27.

⁷⁴ Bernstein, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

munity, into its actual relations, then there is no help for it, it must come out and take its place in the constitution of the community.⁷⁶

In discussing earlier in the same address the causes which led to the downfall of the feudal system, he said :

. . . the progress of industry, the productive energy of the towns, the constantly developing division of labor, and the *wealth of capital*, which came into existence by these means, . . . these were the really and truly revolutionary forces of that time.⁷⁷

Again, speaking of the inventions which marked the close of the eighteenth century, he says :

A stage had thus been reached, at which production itself, by its steadily advancing development had brought into existence instruments of production which were destined to shatter the whole existing system of society; instruments of production and methods of production, which could find no place or room for development in that system.

In this sense I say that the first machine was already in itself a Revolution, for it bore in its cogs and wheels, little as this could be seen from its outward appearance, the germ of the whole of the new conditions of society, founded upon free competition, which were to be developed with the vigour and necessity of a living force.⁷⁸

This whole discussion of the fundamentally economic character of the changes which marked the close of the feudal era constitutes the most clear-cut and luminous exposition of the dependence of social arrangements upon the conditions of economic production which the present writer has had the good fortune to read. Yet, in the face of all this keen analysis, Lassalle still regarded history as the outworking through inner necessity of reason and human liberty, as "a struggle with nature; with the misery, the ignorance, the poverty, the weakness and consequent slavery"⁷⁹ of primitive society. The speech from which the extracts above have been taken he later declared to be

an exposition of that inner soul of things resident in the process of history that manifests itself in the apparently opaque, empirical sequence of events and which has produced this historical sequence out of its own moving, creative force. It is, . . . the strictly developed proof that history is nothing

⁷⁶ Pp., 22, 23.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 54.

else than the self-accomplishing, by inner necessity increasingly progressive unfolding of reason and of freedom, achieving itself under the mask of apparently mere external and material relations.⁸⁰

The contrast between the terms in which Lassalle worked out the admirable analysis of modern European history in the *Working Man's Programme* and the Hegelian gloss in which he enveloped his analysis in the subsequent speech before the tribunal is very striking indeed. Doubtless the well-worn phrases of the Hegelian metaphysic were better adapted to the purpose of a defense in court against the charge of inciting class-hatred than were the clear-cut formulas of economic causation.

We have sufficiently indicated the essential features in the economic interpretation of history. Let us now consider the bearings of the theory upon the sociological concept of progress. This conception of history taken as an explanation or formulation of human progress is open to two objections. In the first place, it makes out of the merely economic aspects of social life an evaluative category which is set up as a standard of measurement of the worth of social change in general; that is to say, it mistakes *economic* values for *human* values. Even when this crude and one-sided view of social phenomena is avoided, a second weakness is evident in the inadequacy of a theory which fails to provide any closer measure of progress than the consistency of ideas and of the whole so-called superstructure of life with the existing form of economic technique. What constitutes this consistency and how it is to be gauged are questions to which only a hesitating and uncertain answer is given, and it is at precisely this point that the student of progress desires the clearest light.

Let us take up the first of these objections. That this is not merely an academic question a moment's consideration will make evident. Whatever its relation to the important place assigned economic phenomena by the economic interpreters of history, it is an undoubted fact that a view of progress is entertained by untold thousands of our people in every part of the country to

⁸⁰ *Science and the Workingmen*, translated by T. B. Veblen, pp. 30, 31.

the effect that the one inevitable sign of advance in a community is the increase of its productive establishments, and the complication and augmentation of the scale upon which it does business. A progressive town is understood at once to mean one whose factories are sending out an increased product from year to year, whose post-office receipts, bank clearings, and building operations are expanding, whose population is advancing in numbers. By the same token the progressive institution of learning and the "successful" individual are those whose incomes and whose visible material possessions are increasing from year to year. That this popular notion, which finds a particularly fertile field in the social consciousness of new and vigorous communities, received very material aid and comfort from the economic writings of the orthodox school throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century is too well known to require comment.

This particular form of the economic evaluation of social change which sees in economic advance—that is, in the augmentation of wealth and especially of capital—an end in itself, independent of its social consequences, is to be distinguished from the other and more subtle theory of the Marxian school. The fallacy of this identification of the increase of goods with advance toward the socially good⁸¹ cannot be better expressed than in the words with which Barth criticizes Durkheim's theory of the division of labor:

He forgets entirely that moral ideas are ideas about values, and that they cannot hinder progress toward greater wealth of values since they themselves first fix these values, first create them. A society, for example, permeated by the ascetic morality, might restrict its production; it would nevertheless make no economic retrogression since these diminutions in goods would not be felt as such. Durkheim always assumes that society has no other end than to produce goods.⁸²

It is true, of course, that economic goods form an indispensable condition of social progress; that without the mastery of *things* man would never have emerged from the position of one of the weaker mammals. Out of the discovery of the buoyancy of water, the useful qualities of fire, and the possibility of aug-

⁸¹ Cf. Barth, *loc. cit.*, p. 302.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 296.

menting by pieces of stone or wood the force and range of blows delivered by the human arm, there came a security and an adaptability into human life which were the guarantee of all future progress. The primitive significance of these material facts must not be overlooked, nor indeed the importance of the economic basis of modern life. But human nature, as we know it, is many-sided, and human wants reach out in a multitude of directions toward things which have only a remote relation to economic goods. Any careful definition of progress must take full account of the satisfaction of the social, intellectual, aesthetic, and moral sides of life.

Let us turn now to the Lassalle-Marxian view of progress as the result of a "technico-economic" process.⁸³ The central idea in both the Lassallean and Marxian schools, as we have seen, is that progressive social change is nothing but the necessary, indeed the inevitable, readjustment of human institutions and activities to a changing economic environment, which, in general, is accepted as an ultimate datum back of which it is not necessary to go. But the present criticism concerns precisely this economic environment. What is *its* law of development, its principle of progress? Surely it can exhibit no unconditioned process which works out its results in entire independence of human will or welfare; it, too, must be subject to conditions and amenable to evaluation. If political and social institutions are viewed as the expression of underlying economic conditions—and this view is measurably correct in the case of many institutions—and if, furthermore, these institutions may be pronounced good only because of their adjustment to the fundamental economic basis of life, then the analysis must simply be carried back one step farther in order to lay bare the ultimate standard of human progress. But the economic interpreters of history do not take this step; they do not go back of the economic environment. This is held to be the criterion in itself. Thus Sombart writes:

History teaches us that what we call advance has always been only change to a higher system of economy, and that those classes thrive who represent this higher system. Behind capitalism there is no "development;" possibly

⁸³ Barth, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

there may be ahead. The degree of production which has been reached by it must in any case be rivalled by any party that will secure the future for itself. In that is shown, I think, the standard of any advance movement.⁸⁴

Thus the process of economic development is regarded as exhibiting in itself, as distinguished from its social results, a principle of progress.⁸⁵

In Engels' *Feuerbach* we find cropping out the same complacent assumption that whatever the economic process of development brings forth is good, and that social progress consists in the adaptation of life to these economic bases.⁸⁶ Now, clearly, if maladjustments and misadaptations of the various activities of social life are found to exist, their elimination in some sort must form a part of the process of progress. But the question is always in order: To what extent does progress consist in the conforming of social and intellectual activities to economic conditions, and to what extent in the modification of these economic conditions due to the reacting influences of evaluative concepts?

It should be pointed out in this connection, first, that the adjustment of social and intellectual activities to the economic environment is far from being a self-directing process which produces certain predictable results with the precision of clock-works. Far from it, the very elements which require adjustment emerge through the operation of processes which are relative to the type and intensity of human wants at a given stage of evolution. And, furthermore, inasmuch as it is these human wants or interests which in the last analysis lie behind all technical processes of production, so changes in the intensity or proportionality of these different wants are constantly reacting upon the economic environment.

The concept "means of production," upon which the whole economic view of history is built, can connote nothing else than those forms of economic activity which turn to account all the

⁸⁴ *Socialism and the Social Movement in the 19th Century*, pp. 156, 157.

⁸⁵ Masaryki, *op. cit.*, p. 211: "While Marx rejects all ideology, he judges and measures progress from the standpoint of his materialism, which is wherever possible mechanical, and particularly in accordance with the progress of technique."

⁸⁶ Pp. 96, 97, 110-25.

knowledge and skill available at a given time for the satisfaction of human wants. It is clear that, if the steam-mill yields a greater satisfaction of human wants at a smaller cost than the hand-mill, there is no possibility that society will return to the latter. And, furthermore, it is evident that in passing over from a hand-mill economy to a steam-mill economy certain social readjustments are inevitable. But to make the passage from the one system to the other the final cause of this social readjustment, as though its exact form could be deduced from the series of economic changes, is almost to erect once more a shrine to the Absolute, whose cult these socialistic zealots have striven so energetically to discredit.

In one of Engels' letters is found this passage:

Although technique is mainly dependent on the condition of science, it is still more true that science depends on the condition and needs of technique. A technical want felt by society is more of an impetus to science than ten universities.⁸⁷

Here we find a slight clue to the relationships existing between the succession of economic stages and the rest of life. These stages, we may infer, are directly influenced by human wants—"technical wants" they are called; but how do technical wants make themselves felt, if not because of the perceived inadequacy of the output of the technical productive process for the satisfaction of human desires. Results yielded by technique do not measure up to felt needs. The essential factors lying back of innumerable social readjustments are then human wants and human control of nature, and the second of these must not be overestimated at the expense of the first.

The fundamental series of social changes viewed from the standpoint of progress is not a series of constantly "higher systems of economy," to quote Sombart's phrase (whatever "higher" may mean in such a connection), but rather a double interwoven series of human wants developing in the presence of a constantly increasing knowledge and control of the physical environment. In so far as this idea of an increasing conquest over nature, or

⁸⁷ Letter of 1894 in *Der sozialistische Akademiker* (1895), p. 373; reprinted in L. Woltmann, *Der historische Materialismus* (1900), p. 248; quoted and translated in Seligman, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

the progressive winning of human freedom from the shackles of the external world, forms a part of the theory under consideration, to that extent the theory contributes a most valuable element to the concept of progress. But, after all, the most important factor in history, and the converse of the principle which has just been stated, is the indefinite expansibility of human interests.⁸⁸ Nothing is gained by the attempt to depersonalize and objectify these essential human forces. For example, when Engels compresses the whole argument of his *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*, into the formula, "The mode of production is in rebellion against the mode of exchange,"⁸⁹ he is simply expressing in terms of economic processes the fundamental truth that human progress is a dialectic of growth which involves in every stage the breaking of old conventions and the substitution for a little time of new ones.

Thus we conclude once more that the center of gravity of the notion of progress is located, not in an external process, be it conceived in terms of divine will, natural order, metaphysical necessity, cosmic or biological causation, or economic processes, but rather in the expanding content of the human life-interests whose increasing realization constitutes progress.

This leads to a final remark upon the fundamental inconsistency of the Marxian economic philosophy of life. While professing to ground itself solely upon the objective and unmoral sequence of economic relations, it nevertheless clings to a belief in progress and to moral judgments drawn from quite other than economic sources.

Marx took over from Hegel's pantheism the teleological idea of progress without understanding that it does not fit his positivistic materialism; at all events his belief in progress is an inexplicable dogma.⁹⁰

Marx and Engels attempted to establish in history the same sort of an objective evolutionary series that Darwin was tracing out in the organic world. Communism in their view was not something which was to be demonstrated better and more just than the present system, but it was presented rather in the light

⁸⁸ Small, *General Sociology*, chap. 31.

⁸⁹ P. 65, 66.

⁹⁰ Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

of an evolutionary necessity; its advent could no more be thwarted than could the laws of biology.⁹¹ Yet, in spite of this fact, the writings of Marx, as Masaryk has pointed out, are full of fierce moral judgments;⁹² his cry is in behalf of the oppressed, whose unrighteous exploitation makes possible the present system. But judgments such as these are derived from no colorless, objective, unhuman standard such as is afforded by the sequence of economic relationships. These judgments, whether right or wrong, are bedded, although unconsciously, upon the deeper principle of the imperative demands of human interests for satisfaction.

V. TELIC ETHICS AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

The point has now been reached at which an attempt may be ventured to bring together the scattered threads of the argument and to weave them into a positive concept of progress. In the chapters which have preceded an effort has been made to divest the really indispensable term "progress" of some of the more conspicuous elements of error which have been associated with it.

In the first place, the idea has been freed from the mass of irrelevant, and at the same time purely formal, notions which early thinkers upon this subject very naturally resorted to in order to bring the conception of an advancing order in human society into consistency with the other elements of their world-view. When these guiding conceptions of a divine purpose, of a universal natural law, of a continuous unfolding of the human spirit, are spoken of as errors, it is not in the sense that they are wholly erroneous, nor indeed that they do not each contain most important elements of truth; but only in the sense that they do not adequately express the whole truth. They are properly elements of belief rather than portions of the content of scientific knowledge. They constitute a world-view profoundly religious in character, which is at once incapable of demonstration and hence no part of positive science, and yet at the same time absolutely fundamental in the thought of the man who entertains it.

⁹¹ Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 118-20; see also X, *Die ethische Frage*, and especially p. 486.

All three point in varying terms to a Significance and a Reality that are higher than we. In this sense they form a part of the conviction of the present writer; yet, as has been pointed out more than once, they are inadmissible as elements in a scientific formulation of the notion of progress.

In the section on progress and evolution the essentially evolutionary character of progress and of its criterion was pointed out, and at the same time it was maintained that this genetic quality inhering in the standard of progress does not, however, constitute its sanction, give it its validity; nor can it alone serve as a measure of progress. This distinction is practically identical with that made by Professor Sorley between the "evolution of ethics" and the "ethics of evolution."⁹³

It has also been pointed out that the idea of progress is essentially an anthropic conception—one relative to human attainment and welfare. Its elements must be sought, not in some non-human cosmical or vital process or mechanism, nor in some incidental organization or specialization which life has assumed, but rather in the variety, intensity, and diffusion of the essential human interests and their normal satisfaction.

And finally an effort has been made to guard the idea of progress from partial and one-sided interpretations, the most conspicuous of which is the so-called economic interpretation of history. This hasty summary of the course of the argument to the present point reveals, what has been implied throughout, the standpoint of the system of sociology, and particularly of the telic ethics, set forth in Professor Small's *General Sociology*.

From the preceding criticism it is evident that a valid conception of progress must, first of all, depend upon results drawn wholly from an inspection of reality. In the second place, it must present not merely a descriptive or genetic account of the course of human evolution through successive eras, but a distinctly evaluative—that is, a teleological—formulation of the worthwhile elements in this evolution. And finally, in the endeavor to frame such a criterion, one must be content with nothing less than an impartial and comprehensive survey of the whole of human life.

⁹³ *Recent Tendencies in Ethics*, pp. 36 ff.

These conditions, it is believed, are realized in the system of sociology just referred to, whose central thesis forms the point of departure for the present study. That thesis may be stated as follows:

The infinitely diverse phenomena of human association are thus particular situations presenting peculiar variations and combinations of the same fundamental elements; viz.: the physical universe; human wants; combinations of these wants in individuals; contacts between individuals, each pursuing purposes given by his wants; conflicts or correspondences of the purposes of the associated individuals; adjustment of the individuals to each other in accommodation of their purposes; consequent union of effort producing new situations, which in turn become conditions for another cycle of the same series, each term having a content somewhat varied from that in the previous cycle, the process continuing beyond any assignable limit.⁹⁴

Now, the strategic importance for the idea of progress of this view of society lies in the fact that it selects for its analysis precisely those aspects of human association upon which the notion of progress must be built, if it is to be given a scientific content at all. In other words, the emphasis is laid directly upon the worth or value side of human life; that is, upon the progressive satisfaction of human wants in all their ramifications and complexities. It is this inner kernel of human satisfactions which gives character to the whole account of social evolution; which is interpreted, not in terms of mechanism, of morphology, or of physiology, but of *purpose*. Society is a process of realizing purposes in the presence of one's fellows. In this view the whole course of social becoming is seen to constitute in its broader outlines a vast progress from an incoherent, feeble, and discordant winning of meager satisfactions of half-felt wants, to an organized and harmonious satisfaction of universally appreciated and highly developed interests diffused throughout the society.

The central importance of the fundamental life-interests which are classified briefly as the health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness interests,⁹⁵ is attested by the following brief quotations, which might be multiplied almost at will:

⁹⁴ *General Sociology*, pp. 186, 187.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, chap. 32.

The initiative of interests in each individual remains always the key to the whole process.⁹⁶ The process, then, which we discover, is a *progress from the least realized individuals in the least realized association, to the most realized individuals in the most realized association*.⁹⁷ The success or failure of the social process to promote the postulated requirements of the persons engaged in the process is now the ultimate test of the process.⁹⁸

So much will serve as a brief indication of the point of view of the *General Sociology*. Several additional remarks should be made upon the details of this view in its relation to the idea of progress. In the first place, it employs a multiple standard for the measurement of social progress.⁹⁹ Inasmuch as life is the resultant of many sorts and intensities of purposes, striven for by individuals and by groups, it follows that any definition of advance in human affairs must be made in terms of the number, intensity, and proportionality of these purpose-interests which constantly act and react upon one another in such a way that the development of each is relative to that of all the others. De Greef hints at something of this sort when he declares that a complete inventory of social activity is necessary for an adequate exhibit of social progress.¹⁰⁰ But the idea is incidental to his main criterion of increasing organization.

Progress in an individual or in a community is thus a function of all the various qualities and aspects of life which are there realized. Not physical well-being alone, nor the abundance of wealth, nor even the moral advance which has been attained, may serve as the measure of progress; all of the interests are required because all are phases of normal human life.

In the second place, the view here advanced implies a multiple standard, not only in the sense that it is a composite standard the use of which involves the consideration of attainments as diversified as life itself, but in another sense as well; there is not only a proportionality in which interests are brought to full expression so as to preserve due symmetry and balance among themselves, but it is also essential that there be the realization in

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

¹⁰⁰ *Le transformisme social*, pp. 409 ff.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 218, 540-43.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 350.

society of a symmetrical and well-distributed realization of the possibilities of life among the associating individuals, such that the various satisfactions shall be generally diffused throughout society and not concentrated in the bosoms of the chosen few, the natural lords and leaders, who, as Nietzsche would have us believe, compensate by their excellence of development, by their surplus of strength and beauty, for all the hideous inferiority of the lower orders. This diffusion of the fruits of culture results in a true "equilibration of persons."¹⁰¹

More and better life by more and better people, beyond any limit of time or quality that our minds can set, is the indicated content of the social process.¹⁰² The ultimate social end which we can discover is progressive improvement in so accommodating ourselves to each other that increasing proportions of the world's population will share in a constant approach toward more and better satisfaction of the health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness desires.¹⁰³

In the third place, this telic view of progress is genuinely dynamic. It contemplates an infinite series of reaccommodations between human experience and human ideals in view of all that becomes known of the possibilities of realizing fullness of life. It is thus confined within no narrow circle marked "pleasure" or "perfection" or "perfect adjustment to environment," but looks out upon the illimitable future, content with the simple affirmation that "the highest thinkable good is a variable condition."¹⁰⁴

Finally, it is important to notice the philosophical basis upon which the telic standard of progress rests.

We may say that all moral judgments are *telic* in form; that is, they are estimates of the relations of actions to ends. The last recourse in practice, for testing the finality of moral judgments, has to be an appeal to the *relative value of the ends* which in turn are held to sanction or condemn conduct.¹⁰⁵

This, then, is the present problem: to arrive at the reasons for believing in the superior value of the general end or criterion described in the preceding paragraphs. The attempt to frame a

¹⁰¹ *General Sociology*, p. 348.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 671.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 523.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 668, 669.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 683.

satisfactory answer to this demand reveals at once the axiomatic character of the assertion that life is good, and that the fullest, richest, and most widely diffused life is the best of all. As Professor Small puts it, "The only intelligible measure of good is human condition."¹⁰⁶ If the reader is convinced that life is evil, no further appeal can be addressed to him. The conception of progress which we are considering rests upon the empirical fact of life as the ultimate basis of valuation. It must be clear from what has preceded that this view is not cramped by any statical circumscriptions. Fullness and richness and diffusion of life is a concept which takes its content from the eternally shifting dialectic of the social process itself. Consequently, it is always expanding and enlarging and undergoing profound change. If by the social process we understand that endless series of reaccommodations between social experience and social ideals which was referred to in a preceding chapter, then we are justified in the judgment: "This is good, for me or for the world around me, which promotes the ongoing of the social process."¹⁰⁷ But this social process is not good *as process*, but as an illimitable series of moral judgments every one of which is vitalized and rendered valid by precisely that axiomatic postulation of the worthfulness of life which, as we have just seen, is the ultimate ground of moral judgments.

Such, in brief, are the outlines within which may be built an adequate criterion of progress. In the very nature of the case, every generation and every community must fill in for itself, out of the materials of its own situation and its own experience, the concrete details which are to be substituted for such generalizations as have been used in the preceding argument. The standard of progress which we have thus arrived at, stated in its briefest terms, reduces to this: "an increased aggregate and juster proportions of the health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness satisfactions in the persons associating."¹⁰⁸ In other words, the standard has been phrased in terms of the realization of the essential activities and enjoyments of individuals;

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 673.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 676.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 682.

and this must, in any view of the case, constitute the ultimate criterion.

There are, however, two or three questions concerning the form in which these results are realized which require notice. Although, as has just been stated, the ultimate form of the criterion of progress must be in terms of the realization of the life of individuals, who constitute, from the point of view of consciousness, the ultimate social fact, nevertheless there are certain mediate ends in which this result expresses itself, which afford materials for an alternative rendering of the fact of progress. These mediate ends may be defined as the perfecting of the technique of control over nature and of the technique of co-operation among the members of society. The two terms "culture" and "civilization," as used in the *General Sociology*,¹⁰⁹ come very close to expressing these ideas. Human progress has proceeded with giant strides when it has received the impetus of a continuous and progressive exploitation of natural forces. Thus, in one view of the matter, the whole process of human advance has been the drama of the increasingly effective struggle of the human mind in its efforts to rise superior to the exigencies of the external world. Science and all the arts are the forerunners of a full realization of the meaning and possibilities of life.

The other result which must precede and accompany the fullest realization of individual life is continuous advance in the technique of social co-operation. Institutions, which are only the structural side of processes of getting things done by men in association, are of course constantly reacted upon in turn by the persons concerned in them.¹¹⁰ It is just at this point that such facts as division of labor, specialization of social structures, and organization of social effort may properly be considered, not indeed as constituting in themselves criteria of advance, but as agencies which in the past, whatever rôle they may play in the future, have proved essential conditions of progress itself.

A strikingly lucid exposition of the part played by increasing rationality in the organization of society has been made by L. T. Hobhouse.¹¹¹ His work affords clear evidence that the general

¹⁰⁹ DeGreef, *op. cit.*, p. 59, *et passim*.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 552.

¹¹¹ *Mind in Evolution*.

point of view set forth above is not in any degree inconsistent with a full recognition of the importance of organization in assuring social advance. A brief reference to some of the conclusions reached in this work may not prove an unfitting close to the present study.

According to Hobhouse, human progress consists in movement toward a point "where all that has made the race what it is is brought into the account and made to prove what it has in it to be."¹¹² The goal of this movement, "as far as we can foresee at present, is the mastery by the human mind of the conditions, internal as well as external, of its life and growth."¹¹³ "Could we arrive at a complete conception of human nature and its possibilities, we should possess final moral truth."¹¹⁴ Here we find an unmistakably telic conception of progress built about the essential human interests which are implied in the somewhat objectionable term "human nature," which in the hands of less skilful users is in danger of taking on a static signification.

We can conceive as not indefinitely remote a stage of knowledge in which the human species should come to understand its own development, its history, conditions, and possibilities, and on the basis of such an understanding should direct its own future, etc.¹¹⁵

This, of course, is a point of view familiar since the publication of Ward's *Dynamic Sociology*. Hobhouse interprets human progress in terms of the organization of mind, which, like the ultimate fact of life, is assumed to be a good. Thus we are told "it is the final goal of reason . . . to bring all the experience of the race to bear in organizing the whole life of the race."¹¹⁶ A final sentence from Hobhouse may serve as our conclusion:

Remote as this ideal organization of life may be, it is suggested that the trend of theoretical science is toward the discovery of the conditions of human development, while the trend of the ethical spirit is toward making that development the supreme object of action. In the union of these movements, human thought would seem to come as near as possible to the limiting conception of the correlation of all experience with all action.¹¹⁷

¹¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 336, 337.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 350.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 402.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 336.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 357.